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A CLEAN WATER ACT,
IF YOU CAN KEEP IT
SEAN G. HERMAN1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Clean Water Act has traveled a successful but tortuous path.
From combustible beginnings on the Cuyahoga River; through the Lake
St. Clair wetlands; to reservoirs near the Miccosukee; and eventually dis-
charged (or “functionally” discharged) off the Maui coast.2  With each
bend, the nearly fifty-year-old Act has proven to be not just resilient, but
among our most successful environmental laws.3  Much of that success
stems from an effective enforcement structure that focuses more on treat-
ing pollutant sources rather than just impaired waters.4  The text creating
that structure has largely remained untouched by Congress for decades.
Though static, the text’s success in reducing pollution may reflect its
ingenuity.  But even if true, its ingenuity would not entirely explain the
Act’s success.
Much of the success also arises from the Act’s evolution with tech-
nology.  Tracer dye studies,5 LiDAR mapping,6 and reporting databases,7
1 Sean G. Herman is an attorney with Hanson Bridgett LLP and an adjunct professor at
Golden Gate University School of Law. The views expressed in this article are his alone and do not
reflect the view of his employer or clients.
2 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004); Cty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).
3 See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, 29 ENV’T. L. REP. 10,469 (Aug.
1999) (“The federal Clean Water Act (CWA) could lay claim to being the most successful environ-
mental program in America. . . Yet, we do not have clean water.”).
4 See Env’t Prot. Agency v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200,
204 (1976) (discussing intent of that Clean Water Act as including “direct restrictions on discharges
facilitate enforcement by making it unnecessary to work backward from an overpolluted body of
water to determine which point sources are responsible and which must be abated.”).
5 See Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 984 (D. Haw. 2014) (dis-
cussing tracer dye study).
6 See The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 85
Fed. Reg. 22,250, 22,327 (April 21, 2020) [hereinafter Navigable Waters Protection Rule] (discuss-
ing LiDAR as tool for assessing wetlands).
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among other tools, have lowered to unprecedented levels the barrier to
water quality enforcement.  As technology takes off, regulations have
tried to keep pace.8  So if technology has been the engine driving the
Act’s evolution, regulations have been the gear shift governing the speed
with which it is implemented.
But unlike the statutory text, regulations under the Clean Water Act
change often.  In this last decade alone, we saw one administration craft
a regulation called the Clean Water Rule, which the next tore down
through suspension and repeal.9  Then, it installed a replacement regula-
tion called the Navigable Waters Protection Rule.10  And now, a new
administration of differing political views may tear that regulation down
just like its predecessor.11  Perhaps this third mutation may prove the
process—promulgate, suspend, repeal, replace—to be some Hegelian di-
alectic that satisfies all in the end.12  That is an unlikely outcome, how-
ever, since the problem lies not in the ingenuity (or lack thereof) of the
regulatory language, but in the immutable text of its origin statute.
When it enacted the original statute in 1972, Congress chose the
following phrase to describe what the Clean Water Act protects: “the
waters of the United States.”13  The phrase lacked any commonly under-
stood meaning in 1972, just as it does today.  It cannot mean all waters
within the United States, as this would risk overstepping the Commerce
Clause.14  But it also must mean more than just the navigable waters
7 See, e.g., California State Water Resources Control Board’s Stormwater Multiple Applica-
tion and Report Tracking System, available at https://smarts.waterboards.ca.gov/smarts/faces/Sw-
SmartsLogin.xhtml.
8 For instance, the Clean Water Rule discussed how science “has advanced considerably in
recent years” and how that development “play[s] a critical role in informing the agencies’ interpreta-
tion of the [Act’s] scope.” Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed.
Reg. 37,054, 37,057 (June 29, 2015) [hereinafter Clean Water Rule].
9 Id.; Definition of “Waters of the United States”–Addition of an Applicability Date to 2015
Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5,200 (Feb. 6, 2018); Definition of “Waters of the United
States”–Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019).
10 Navigable Waters Protection Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250.
11 See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review (Jan.
20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-
list-of-agency-actions-for-review/ [hereinafter White House Fact Sheet].
12 Hegel’s dialectic assumes a rational political structure and begins with a political thesis
(e.g., a ruler’s authority is absolute). An antithesis then contradicts the thesis (e.g., resistance to
ruler’s absolute authority). As the populace’s resistance and ruler’s suppression intensify, they move
toward a synthesis (e.g., the ruler brings the populace back under control by providing the populace
with more control through charters, rights, or laws). Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln IV, Hegelian
Dialectical Analysis of U.S. Voting Laws, 42 U. DAYTON L. REV. 87, 91-92 (2017); Raj Bhala,
Hegelian Reflections on Unilateral Action in the World Trading System, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
159, 181 (1997) [hereinafter Hegelian Reflections].
13 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (defining “navigable waters”).
14 See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1870) (holding that navigable waters form a
continued highway for interstate commerce that is subject to Commerce Clause jurisdiction).
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traditionally regulated since the United States’ inception, like waters
used for interstate commerce and waters susceptible for use with reason-
able improvement.15  If not, then what purpose would the definition
serve?16  Had Congress intended to reach only those waters historically
known as “navigable waters,” it begs the question of why Congress
would bother defining “navigable waters” as anything besides its tradi-
tional meaning.  And its chosen definition—“waters of the United
States”—does not fit within that traditional meaning.
Where then in the wide spectrum of “waters of the United States”
does the subject matter of this statute fall?  Without definition or criteria
from Congress to guide their way, the agencies’ answers from the last ten
presidential administrations have shown that the question is a Rorschach
Test.  To one administrator, a prairie pothole could be a jurisdictional
water.17  To another, it’s not.18
The framers warned of such mutability in policymaking. “It poisons
the blessing of liberty itself,” wrote Publius, and it would be of little
benefit if laws are “repealed and revised before they are promulgated, or
undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is
today, can guess what it will be tomorrow.”19  Without knowing what the
law will be, what merchant, farmer, or manufacturer would invest their
fortunes in a future when they “can have no assurance that [their] prepar-
atory labors and advances will not render [them] a victim to an incon-
stant government?”20  The “continual change even of good measures is
inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every prospect of
success.”21
The safeguard against the political instability that Publius feared
was a separation of powers and a system of checks and balances.  Split-
ting legislative powers between the House of Representatives and Senate
encourages stability as the Senate acts as a “salutary check” on the
House.22  But since Congress passed the Clean Water Act, we have not
seen mutable policymaking arising in the legislative branch.  We have
15 United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 404-10 (1940).
16 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731 (2006) (“This provision shows that the
Act’s term ‘navigable waters’ includes something more than traditional navigable waters.”).
17 Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,059.
18 Navigable Waters Protection Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,314.





Herman: A CLEAN WATER ACT, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2021
66 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J. [Vol. 13
seen the opposite: a period of stasis.23  Congressional stasis has forced
the executive branch to assume a larger role in policymaking.
Rather than address policy to keep pace with technology and litiga-
tion by passing legislation, Congress has relied on vague directives it
gave the agencies decades ago.  One such vague directive is the Act’s
subject matter: “waters of the United States.”24  Rather than assume its
laboring oar and resolve the difficult task of determining what waters the
federal government regulates, Congress has left the task to the agencies.
Through its inaction, this article contends, Congress’s delegation of poli-
cymaking authority to the agencies violates the separation of powers in
two ways.
First, the phrase “waters of the United States” fails to provide agen-
cies and courts with an intelligible principle that can measure whether
the agencies have followed Congress’s guidance.  A missing intelligible
principle violates the nondelegation doctrine.  And this missing intelligi-
ble principle is all the more apparent as textualism and its demand for
clarity gains general acceptance as an interpretative methodology among
courts.
Second, because the phrase “waters of the United States” is standar-
dless, it fails to apprise the public of what conduct the law requires.  Not
even a majority of the Supreme Court can decide what the phrase
means.25  When ambiguity becomes this uncertain, it violates the void-
for-vagueness doctrine.
With these two violations in mind, this article begins by posing a
thesis: The Clean Water Act regulates all “waters of the United States.”
It then suggests a two-part antithesis: Congress violated the nondelega-
tion and void-for-vagueness doctrines by defining the Clean Water Act
only as reaching “waters of the United States.”  And it resolves the con-
flict with a synthesis: a call for Congress to amend the Clean Water Act
by providing the statute with a more stable and intelligible jurisdictional
reach.  Federal oversight in water quality regulation is a necessity.  But
to what degree is a policy decision that Congress has yet to make.
II. THESIS: A HISTORY OF CLEAN WATER IN FOUR CASES
Begin with the statute.  Enacted in 1972, the Clean Water Act
amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and remade how the
23 Congress has not significantly amended the Clean Water Act since it enacted the Water
Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 76 (1987).
24 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
25 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
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United States regulated water quality at a federal level.26  The Act’s pur-
pose is “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.”27  And one of its primary goals was to
eliminate the discharge of pollutants to “navigable waters” by 1985.28
Though it did not reach this goal, its enforcement mechanism proved
effective.
The Act’s core prohibition is the unpermitted “discharge of any pol-
lutant,”29 a phrase which means “any addition of any pollutant to naviga-
ble waters from any point source.”30  The regulated conduct thus is the
“discharge” or “addition” of pollutants, and the “navigable waters” are
what the Act protects.  But for all of the Act’s definition and structure, it
never determines what are the “navigable waters” it protects.  It simply
defines these as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas.”31
Indeterminacy surrounds this definition of the Act’s keystone, “nav-
igable waters.”  When Congress enacted the Act in 1972, “navigable wa-
ters” enjoyed a commonly understood, historical meaning.  The term
meant waters that are “navigable in fact when they are used, or are sus-
ceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for com-
merce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the
customary modes of trade and travel on water.”32  Congress could regu-
late the “navigable waters” within each State so long as it tied those
waters to the interstate commerce clause with navigability.33
But Congress did not draw only on this historical meaning when
defining what waters its Act protected.  Instead, Congress defined “navi-
gable waters” as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas.”34  Unlike “navigable waters,” the phrase “waters of the United
States” had no commonly understood meaning.  Nor does the Act define
“waters of the United States.”35  Without a definition, courts have de-
scribed the phrase as “notoriously unclear,”36 “elusive and unpredict-
able,”37 and defining it “a contentious and difficult task.”38  This lack of
26 An Act to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. Law No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816 (1972).
27 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
28 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
29 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
30 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
31 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
32 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870).
33 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824).
34 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
35 33 U.S.C. § 1362.
36 Sackett v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 566 U.S. 120, 132 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
37 State v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 989 F.3d 874, 879 (10th Cir. 2021).
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definition is the focus of constitutional concern, which has been litigated
at length in the half-century since its enactment.
Four cases underscore this constitutional concern.  First is Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway.39  After the Act’s enact-
ment in 1972, one of the two agencies charged with enforcing it—the
Army Corps of Engineers (the other being Environmental Protection
Agency)—promulgated regulations defining “waters of the United
States” in accordance with its historical meaning.40  But without much of
any analysis or discussion of the Act’s text, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia held that the Army Corps lacked authority to
adopt this definition because Congress “asserted federal jurisdiction over
the nation’s waters to the maximum extent permissible under the Com-
merce Clause.”  So the Act’s phrase, “navigable waters,” “is not limited
to the traditional tests of navigability.”41
The second case is United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc.42  After Callaway, the Army Corps revisited its regulations and
promulgated a definition that included within “navigable waters” non-
navigable wetlands adjacent to navigable creeks.43  The regulations
sought to extend the definition of “waters of the United States” to the
outer limits of Congress’s commerce power.44  In considering the Army
Corps’ regulation, the Supreme Court invoked Chevron45—which was
just a year old at that point—and concluded with a double negative: The
Court could not say that the Army Corps’ interpretation of the Act was
unreasonable.46  The Court acknowledged that it was facially “unreason-
able to classify ‘lands,’ wet or otherwise, as ‘waters.’”47  But the transi-
tion from water to solid ground is not necessarily or typically an abrupt
one, and the transition includes shallows, marshes, mudflats, swamps,
and bogs that make determining a water’s limit “far from obvious.”48  So
the Court turned to legislative history and the Act’s purpose to support its
deference to the Army Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over non-naviga-
38 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 624 (2018).
39 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
40 Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,119 (April 3,
1974).
41 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
42 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
43 Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320, 31,324-
25 (July 25, 1975); Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,144
(July 19, 1977).
44 Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. at 37,144 n.2.
45 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
46 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985).
47 Id. at 132.
48 Id.
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ble wetlands.49  At bottom, the Court noted, “the term ‘waters’ as used in
the Act does not necessarily exclude ‘wetlands.’”50
The third case is Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
Army Corp of Engineers.51  The Army Corps’ 1986 regulations defined
“navigable waters” to include all waters “used as habitat by [ ] migratory
birds which cross state lines.”52  The Supreme Court looked upon this
regulation with some skepticism, noting that when “an administrative in-
terpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we
expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”53  The Army
Corps’ regulation—often called the Migratory Bird Rule—had asserted
jurisdiction over an abandoned sand and gravel pit.  But the Court could
find no “clear statement from Congress” that would allow the Army
Corps to regulate waters like the isolated pond at issue.54  Federal regula-
tion of isolated ponds “would result in a significant impingement of the
States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use,” but no
language within the Act could countenance such an outcome.55  The
Court then made two comments in dictum that casted doubt on the Cal-
laway holding.  First, the Court commented on how the Migratory Bird
Rule strays from the Army Corps’ original interpretation of the Act as
extending only to navigable-in-fact waters.56  Second, the Court noted
that Congress enjoys broad authority under the Commerce Clause, but
that authority is not unlimited.57
The fourth case is Rapanos v. United States.58  A fractured Supreme
Court invalidated the tributary and adjacent wetlands provisions of the
Army Corps’ 1986 regulations.  Justice Scalia wrote the plurality, joined
by three other justices; Justice Kennedy wrote his own concurrence; and
Justice Stevens wrote a dissent joined by three others.59  The issue was
whether “navigable waters” includes wetlands that do not physically abut
navigable-in-fact waters.60  The plurality noted that the phrase “naviga-
49 Id. at 132-33.
50 Id. at 139 n.11.
51 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
52 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206,
41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986) [hereinafter 1986 Regulations].
53 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 172
(2001).
54 Id. at 174.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 168.
57 Id. at 173.
58 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
59 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer also wrote a clarifying concurrence and dissent,
respectively, but joined in the plurality and dissent, respectively.
60 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 729-30 (2006) (plurality).
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ble waters” means something more than traditional navigable waters, but
the qualifier “navigable” is not without significance.61  Regulating non-
navigable waters and lands abutting navigable-in-fact waters impinges
upon the States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use.62
Without a “clear and manifest” statement that Congress intended to in-
trude upon this traditional state authority, the plurality would not inter-
pret “waters of the United States” as allowing it.63  So the plurality
defined “navigable waters” in accordance with its commonsense under-
standing of the term: “only those relatively permanent, standing or con-
tinuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic features’ that are
described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes.’”64
Only four justices signed onto the plurality.  Justice Kennedy joined
the plurality in judgment and wrote a concurrence that defined “naviga-
ble waters” by a “significant nexus” test.65  Through the “significant
nexus” test, the EPA and Army Corps could determine what “navigable
waters” they may regulate by finding whether non-abutting wetland sig-
nificantly affects the physical, chemical, and biological integrity of a
navigable-in-fact water.66  Faced with a plurality and concurrence, it has
been unclear whether either opinion controls district courts and circuit
courts’ interpretations of the Clean Water Act.67
Chief Justice Roberts foresaw this obvious consequence when he
bemoaned how the Court could not issue an opinion commanding a ma-
jority for how to read the Clean Water Act’s reach.68  He then called on
the EPA and Army Corps to develop regulations within “the broad,
somewhat ambiguous, but nonetheless clearly limiting terms Congress
employed” to define “waters of the United States.”69
The EPA and Army Corps accepted that invitation, but ultimately
without success.  Under the Obama Administration, the agencies promul-
61 Id. at 731.
62 Id. at 738.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 739 (cleaned up).
65 Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
66 Id. at 779.
67 For instance, the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits have concluded that the Clean Water Act
may reach either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s standard. United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d
56, 64-66 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2011); United
States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009). The Fourth Circuit follows Justice Kennedy’s
test, without having decided whether the plurality’s test may also apply. Precon Dev. Corp., Inc. v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 2011). The Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits have held that Justice Kennedy’s test controls. Orchard Hill Bldg. Co. v. U. S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 893 F.3d 1017, 1021 (7th Cir. 2018); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d
993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007).
68 Id. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
69 Id.
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gated the Clean Water Rule, which followed Justice Kennedy’s “signifi-
cant nexus” test.70  This regulation extended the Act’s jurisdiction to
include intermittent and ephemeral streams that are hydrologically con-
nected to navigable waters by either being within a specified distance of
a navigable water’s ordinary high water mark, or as determined case-by-
case.71
The Clean Water Rule became mired in litigation and ultimately
subject to repeal efforts under the Trump Administration.72  For its part,
the Trump Administration promulgated the Navigable Waters Protection
Rule, which aimed to align the agencies’ definition with the Rapanos
plurality.73  Among its changes was the categorical exclusion from “nav-
igable waters” of those ephemeral waters that flow only in response to
precipitation.74  These seasonal or temporary bodies of water are preva-
lent in the arid and semi-arid west and include vernal pools, arroyos, and
dry washes that fill with water only after seasonal rains or snowmelt.75
The 2020 regulation also limited the Act’s jurisdiction over wetlands to
include only “adjacent wetlands” that either abut or have a direct hydro-
logical surface connection with traditionally navigable waters.76
At the time of this article, the Biden Administration is now recon-
sidering the 2020 regulation.77  And it has several options before it.  It
could leave the 2020 regulation in place; or repeal it and reinstate the
1986 regulation.78  Or it could repeal and re-promulgate the 2015 regula-
tion.  It could also repeal and replace the regulation with something en-
tirely new.  Or it could promulgate a new regulation that builds off the
2020 regulation.
Of these options, leaving the 2020 regulation as-is appears to be the
least tenable.  Political pressures make that outcome unlikely, which
highlights the game of regulatory volleyball taking place.79  In eight
70 Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054.
71 Id. at 37,058.
72 Definition of “Waters of the United States”–Addition of an Applicability Date to 2015
Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. at 5,201; Definition of “Waters of the United
States”–Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56,626.
73 Navigable Waters Protection Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250.
74 Id. at 22,251.
75 Id. at 22,288.
76 Id. at 22,251.
77 White House Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
78 Until the Clean Water Rule in 2015, the text of the agencies’ regulations has been consis-
tent since 1986 (Army Corps) and 1988 (EPA). See 1986 Regulations, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206; Clean
Water Act Section 404 Program Definitions and Permit Exemptions; Section 404 State Program
Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 20,764 (June 6, 1988).
79 See, e.g., Beth Burger, Climate Collision: Trump’s EPA Rewrote the Rules on Air, Water
Energy, USA TODAY (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2020/
10/29/climate-change-escalates-voters-face-choice-deregulate-re-regulate/3668667001/ (quoting
9
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years, we have seen the agencies impose four different jurisdictional
reaches for the Clean Water Act: the 1986 Army Corps Rule, the 2015
Clean Water Rule, return of the 1986 Army Corps Rule, and the 2020
Navigable Waters Protection Rule.  With the Biden Administration, we
may soon see our fifth.
III. ANTITHESIS 1: NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE AND THE RISE OF
TEXTUALISM
When agencies play a game of regulatory volleyball, they risk vio-
lating the separation of powers doctrine.  Under this foundational doc-
trine, American democracy diffuses its governing powers across the three
branches.  Congress legislates (Article I), the President executes (Article
II), and the courts interpret (Article III).80  This separation of powers was
a remedy born from tyranny.  When both “legislative and executive pow-
ers are united in the same person,” “there can be no liberty.”81  So the
“separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government” is
“essential to the preservation of liberty.”82  The gradual encroachment on
and accumulation of all powers of one branch by another is the “tyranni-
cal concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands.”83
A government breaches its duty to the People to preserve liberty when
“Congress gives up its legislative power and transfers it to the President,
or to the judicial branch.”84  Put otherwise, the Constitution puts it be-
yond Congress’s power to delegate all of its legislative power to another
branch.85  This bar against certain delegations of constitutional authority
is otherwise known as the nondelegation doctrine.
A. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
The nondelegation doctrine arises not from the Constitution’s text
but from its underlying principle.  Nondelegation is “a principle univer-
sally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government ordained by the constitution.”86  That “system of govern-
then-California Attorney General Xavier Becerra as believing there was no “environmental policy
stance the Trump administration had taken that a hypothetical Biden administration would likely
defend,” including the Navigable Waters Protection Rule).
80 U.S. CONST. art. I-III.
81 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (cleaned up).
82 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
83 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison).
84 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
85 Id. at 407.
86 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
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ment” is the separation of powers outlined in the Constitution’s first
three articles.
Of course, a separation of powers does not prohibit a sharing of
powers.  Practicality requires a government “in which the legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judiciary departments have not been kept totally separate
and distinct.”87  A separation of powers thus does not seek purity in
preventing powers from bleeding among the three branches.  It instead
protects against the accumulation of the whole power of one branch in
the hands of another.88  Powers may mix among the branches, with the
separation of powers violated when there is “too great a mixture, and
even an actual consolidation, of the different powers.”89  Nondelegation
thus allows one branch to seek assistance from another branch, but “the
extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to com-
mon sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordina-
tion.”90  Neither separation of powers nor the nondelegation doctrine
prohibit Congress from obtaining another branch’s help.91  And today,
“in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an
ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”92  The “com-
plex economic and social problems” that demand broad delegations are
as much a reality today as they were seventy-five years ago when the
Supreme Court first acknowledged this reality.93
The point at which a general directive from Congress violates the
nondelegation doctrine, however, is at best unclear; at worst, it is perhaps
perfunctory.  All the nondelegation doctrine demands is that Congress
accompany its delegation of power with an “intelligible principle.”94
The “intelligible principle” requires only that “Congress clearly deline-
ate[ ] the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the
boundaries of this delegated authority.”95  So, on one hand, Congress
“must provide substantial guidance” to agencies in how to regulate mat-
ters affecting “the entire national economy.”96  But on the other hand,
Congress need not legislate with precision by, say, providing a “determi-
87 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
88 See id. (interpreting Montesquieu as saying that when “the WHOLE power of one depart-
ment is exercised by the same hands which possess the WHOLE power of another department, the
fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.”).
89 Id.
90 J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 406.
91 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
92 Id.
93 Am. Power & Light Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
94 J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409.
95 Am. Power & Light, 329 U.S. at 105.
96 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001).
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nate criterion” for when an agency is regulating too much.97  Requiring
an intelligible principle ensures that Congress—the branch that is most
responsive to the electorate—makes the important policy choices.98  And
on balance, a law violates the nondelegation doctrine only absent stan-
dards that make it impossible for courts to determine whether an agency
has obeyed the will of Congress.99
As the Supreme Court recently acknowledged, this test is “not de-
manding.”100  That is an understatement.  Only twice has the Court found
that a statute violated the nondelegation doctrine.101  And both times
were in 1935.  So, to paraphrase Cass Sunstein, the nondelegation doc-
trine has had one good year, and 232 bad ones (and counting).102
Given the trouble defining where to draw the line between prohib-
ited and permitted delegations, nondelegation has been “a judicially un-
derenforced norm, and properly so.”103  Despite its vital aim at
preserving the constitutional design of American democracy, history
shows that courts place (and have always placed) the nondelegation doc-
trine threshold on the floor, near the dustbin.
B. RISE OF TEXTUALISM
In theory, the rise of textualism would appear to strengthen the
nondelegation doctrine.  As Justice Elena Kagan has proclaimed, “We’re
all textualists now.”104  The proclamation reflects how courts interpret
law today, which differs substantially from how they interpreted law in
1972 when Congress enacted the Clean Water Act.  Textualism empha-
sizes the primacy of a statute’s text and requires that courts use all objec-
tive tools of statutory construction when interpreting law.105  Not so
much before the rise of textualism.
97 Id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 317 (2000)
[hereinafter Nondelegation Canons] (“it is extremely difficult to defend the idea that courts should
understand Article I, section 1 of the Constitution to require Congress to legislate with
particularity.”).
98 Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring in judgment).
99 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 425-26 (1944)).
100 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019).
101 A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
102 Nondelegation Canons, supra note 97, at 322.
103 Id. at 338.
104 Justice Elena Kagan, “A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes”
The Scalia Lecture, Harvard Law School (Nov. 17, 2015), available at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=DPEtszFT0Tg.
105 Textualism As Fair Notice, 123 HARV. L. REV. 542 (2009).
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Take the Supreme Court’s 1971 holding in Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe.106  The Court noted in the opinion’s twenty-ninth footnote that it
would use the statute’s text to divine legislative intent—but only after
concluding that the legislative history itself was ambiguous.107  Working
alongside a judicial branch that approached cases like Overton Park with
little concern for a statute’s text, it follows that Congress in 1971 would
have been less concerned about the text it negotiated and placed in the
final statute.  If it could expect that the words exchanged on the Senate
floor would have equal if not greater force than the words set to paper,
then why put forth the added effort to clarify the ambiguous words on the
paper?
Now contrast Overton Park with Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, in which
Justice Kagan noted that courts should not allow an ambiguous legisla-
tive history “to muddy clear statutory language.”108  Courts should now
turn to legislative history to “clear up ambiguity, not create it.”109  This
approach reflects that “legislative history is not the law.”110  Unlike the
purposivist approach that prioritizes considerations like legislative his-
tory, textualism ensures that the regulated community has fair notice of
what the law requires.111  “Fair notice squarely aligns with textualism’s
goal of approximating how the average, reasonable citizen would inter-
pret a statute.”112
With textualism in mind, return to the nondelegation doctrine.  In its
most recent encounter with the doctrine, the Supreme Court noted that “a
nondelegation inquiry always begins (and often almost ends) with statu-
tory interpretation.”113  Courts must look to the statute’s text—consid-
ered alongside its context, its purpose, and then its history—to see what
task it delegates and the instructions provided to achieve that task.114
Add to this inquiry deference to agencies under the Chevron doc-
trine.115  When a statute is clear, a court’s inquiry ends.  But when there
is ambiguity, a court will defer to an agency’s permissible interpretation
of that ambiguous text.116  That “court may not substitute its own con-
struction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by
106 Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
107 See id. at 412 n.29 (“Because of this ambiguity [in the legislative committee reports] it is
clear that we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the legislative intent.”).
108 Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011).
109 Id. at 574.
110 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1631 (2018).
111 Textualism As Fair Notice, supra note 105, at 542.
112 Id. (cleaned up).
113 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019).
114 Id. at 2123-24.
115 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
116 Id. at 842-45.
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the administrator of an agency.”117  If through ambiguity Congress “ex-
plicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,” then courts will consider that as
an express delegation of authority.118
Ambiguity, however, may be in the eye of the beholder.  “Of
course, there is no errorless test for identifying or recognizing ‘plain’ or
‘unambiguous’ language.”119  In other words, “[o]ne judge’s clarity is
another judge’s ambiguity.”120  And “[a]s is all too often the case with
deceptively simple statutory provisions,” a statutory provision—espe-
cially one addressing jurisdiction—“admits of a troublesome ambigu-
ity.”121  The ambiguity may arise when the law is subject to more than
two meanings, or when the language confronts the realities of trade and
commerce.122  And if courts cannot defer to Congress’s interpretation of
a statute, then how can they defer to the executive agency’s
interpretation?123
Given that the textualist purview that Congress now faces is more
demanding than the more purposivist approach that dominated in 1972,
one would think that courts would turn a more critical eye toward the
stunted hurdle that is the nondelegation doctrine.  Not so—or at least, not
yet.  Even through the exacting textualist eye, “once a court interprets the
statute, it may find that the constitutional question all but answers it-
self.”124  In its most recent nondelegation case, Gundy v. United States,
the Court considered a statute giving the Attorney General “authority to
specify the applicability of” sex offender requirements to those convicted
before the law’s enactment.125  And in holding that the law did not vio-
late the nondelegation doctrine, the Court’s plurality noted that if this
“delegation is unconstitutional, then most of Government is unconstitu-
tional—dependent as Congress is on the need to give discretion to execu-
tive officials to implement its programs.”126  Even in a textualist’s world,
nondelegation may have no home.  With Gundy, the Supreme Court en-
trenched the doctrine’s impotence and left it without a cure.  Perhaps it is
time to move on—or perhaps not.
117 Id. at 843-44.
118 Id.
119 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981).
120 Judge Brett Kavanaugh, “The Role of the Judiciary in Maintaining the Separation of Pow-
ers” Joseph Story Lecture, The Heritage Foundation (Feb. 1, 2018), available at https://
www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-02/HL1284.pdf.
121 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. F.E.R.C., 792 F.2d 1165, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
122 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1421-22
(1987).
123 Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1234 (2016).
124 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019).
125 Id. at 2122.
126 Id. at 2130.
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With his dissent in Gundy, Justice Gorsuch (joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas) would have given the nondelegation doc-
trine teeth.127  Though Justice Alito did not join the Gundy dissent, he
wrote separately to acknowledge that he would reconsider nondelegation
when there was a majority for him to join.128  And Justice Kavanaugh—
who took no part in considering and deciding Gundy—later expressed a
desire to consider the nondelegation doctrine in future cases.129  With at
least five justices interested in revisiting nondelegation, the nondelega-
tion doctrine appears dormant but not extinct.
C. THE NONDELEGABLE POLICY OF DECIDING WHAT WATERS THE
CLEAN WATER ACT REGULATES
Given this renewed interest, the Clean Water Act and its jurisdic-
tional phrase, “waters of the United States,” violates the nondelegation
doctrine.  Congress rightly decided that water quality in the United States
demanded regulation.  It created a permit or prohibit enforcement struc-
ture, buttressed with investigative directives and grant programs.  And it
left to the agencies the tough decision of deciding what “waters” to regu-
late.  Fair enough, as Congress need not legislate with precision.
But Congress must at least provide the agencies with an “intelligible
principle” that allows Congress, the courts, and the public to know
whether the agencies are following Congress’s guidance.  Congress
could have listed particular waters that it intended to regulate.  Or it
could have excluded waterbodies it desired not to regulate.  Better yet,
Congress could have provided criteria that the EPA and Army Corps
must rely on in identifying which of the waters fell within the Act’s juris-
diction and which fell outside it.  Benchmarks like these could provide
the meaningful way to know what the law requires and whether the agen-
cies and public are following it.
Yet the only standard Congress offered was that the agencies regu-
late “waters of the United States.”  Without a commonly understood
meaning, its meaning was—and remains—unascertainable.  Does this
phrase include only waters, or does it also include wetlands, pocosins,
bogs, and desert swales?  Does the phrase reach only traditionally navi-
gable-in-fact waters, or does it encompass all waters—whether navigable
127 Id. at 2131-48 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (discussing a restated “intelligible principle” test
that asks whether the statute assigns to the executive only the responsibility to make factual findings,
or whether it sets forth facts that the executive must consider and criteria against which to measure
them, or whether Congress—not the Executive—made the policy judgment).
128 Id. at 2130-31 (Alito, J., concurring).
129 Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari).
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or otherwise?  If these hyper-technical questions only addressed issues at
the fringe of the agencies’ jurisdiction, then the constitutional inquiry
would not be as difficult to resolve.  But these questions go to the heart
of the Act, with particular attention to its section 404 dredge and fill
permitting structure.130  If you fill in a wetland, you may be violating the
Clean Water Act—or not.  The answer depends as much on the wetland’s
location as it does the year in which the activity takes place.
Justice Breyer tried clarifying the scope of “waters of the United
States” by interpreting it so it reflects Congress’s intent to fully exercise
its Commerce Clause powers and “leave the enforcing agency with the
task of restricting the scope of that definition, either wholesale through
regulation or retail through development permissions.”131  Even if we
could glean that intent from the statute’s text (a murky “if”), the interpre-
tation concedes that Congress offered no guidance to the agencies as to
how far the Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction extends.  At most, it sets a
floor at “navigable waters” and a ceiling at “waters.”  But even then, land
like wetlands is considered to be jurisdictional.  So its ceiling is not lim-
ited to even “waters.”  Without much of any guidance, let alone substan-
tial guidance, the Act lays down no clear rule and provides no framework
for the agencies to follow in determining which waters the Act regulates.
Even under the easily surmountable test outlined in the Gundy plurality,
this statutory delegation of authority violates the nondelegation doctrine.
IV. ANTITHESIS 2: VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
The rise of textualism and its concern for fair notice sprang from
similar constitutional roots as the concern for excessively vague laws.
This concern is known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine.132  Under it,
courts emphasize the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on depriving per-
sons of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.133  The gov-
ernment violates this guarantee through laws that fail to give people of
“ordinary intelligence” fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or through
laws so standardless that they invite arbitrary enforcement.134  Prohibit-
ing vagueness in criminal statutes thus protects due process by ensuring
the “ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law.”135
130 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
131 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 811 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
132 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 108; Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015).
135 Johnson, 576 U.S. at 595 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926)).
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A. VAGUENESS AS THE OTHER SIDE OF THE NONDELEGATION COIN
A void-for-vagueness doctrine shares with the nondelegation doc-
trine the same concerns over separation of powers.  With a vague statute,
Congress has impermissibly delegated basic policy matters to those en-
forcing the law, such as agencies.136  A vague law invites the agency to
resolve disputes on “an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”137  With vague, un-
certain statutes, how is the ordinary person supposed to know what con-
duct the statute polices?  “A statistical analysis of the state reporter? A
survey?  Expert evidence?  Google?  Gut instinct?”138  With vague stat-
utes, the answer is not evident.
To be sure, there are many otherwise constitutional laws that place a
person’s fate on their ability to estimate rightly to “some matter of de-
gree.”139  Citizens bear some responsibility for resolving ambiguity by
playing “an active civic role” in informing themselves of what a law
requires.140  But if the regulated community cannot readily understand
what conduct the statute prohibits, then the statute fails to provide fair
warning.141  Without fair warning, a vague statute will trap the
innocent.142
That is why the void-for-vagueness doctrine is “a corollary of the
separation of powers,” much like the nondelegation doctrine.143  Like the
nondelegation doctrine and its “intelligible principle,” the void-for-
vagueness doctrine requires that Congress, and not any other branch, de-
fine the basics of what conduct the law permits or prohibits.144  As with
nondelegation doctrine, “perhaps the most meaningful aspect of the
vagueness doctrine is . . . the requirement that a legislature establish min-
imal guidelines to govern law enforcement.”145  A legislature may not
abdicate its responsibility “for setting the standards of the criminal law”
by enacting standardless statutes that allow the executive and judicial
branches “to pursue their personal predilections.”146
136 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
137 Id.
138 Johnson, 576 U.S. at 597 (quoting United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir.
2009) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)).
139 Id. at 603-04 (quoting Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913)).
140 Textualism As Fair Notice, supra note 105, at 548.
141 Id. at 550 (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)).
142 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109.
143 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2018).
144 Id.
145 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974).
146 Id. at 575.
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But unlike the nondelegation doctrine, as some have argued, the
void-for-vagueness doctrine rests on “principled judicial application”
that does not “threaten to unsettle so much of modern government.”147
Unsurprisingly then, courts have relied on the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine to strike down unconstitutional statutory provisions while the
nondelegation doctrine finds refuge only in dissents and academia.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine’s extent, however, is limited.
What ambiguity the Constitution tolerates depends on the statute.  Eco-
nomic and civil enactments may enjoy greater ambiguity, while laws im-
posing criminal penalties require greater precision.148  With economic
and civil statutes, courts are more willing to resolve ambiguity by defer-
ring, “perhaps to some degree, to the interpretation of the statute given
by those charged with enforcing it.”149  When those charged with enforc-
ing the statute adopt regulations, courts may then charge the regulated
community with some duty “to clarify the meaning of the regulation by
its own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative process.”150  As the
Supreme Court noted in dictum in its 1982 decision, Village of Hoffman
Estates, an “administrative regulation will often suffice to clarify a[n ec-
onomic regulation] standard with an otherwise uncertain scope.”151
In the nearly-forty years since Village of Hoffman Estates, the Su-
preme Court has embraced a greater focus on textualism.  In turn, the
Court increased its demands of Congress’s statutes—whether criminal or
civil—by focusing more on the statute’s language.  Two years after the
Court decided Village of Hoffman Estates it decided Chevron.  While the
Court has not overturned Chevron and courts still defer to reasonable
agency interpretations of genuinely ambiguous statutes, the Court ap-
pears less willing to subordinate to the other branches its interpretative
powers to say what the law is.152  This hesitancy may arise from con-
cerns for the separation of powers and for ensuring that statutes provide
fair notice.  Allowing agencies to clarify vague civil statutes with regula-
tions aligns with Chevron.  But is that consistent with textualism’s goal
of providing fair notice by approximating how average, reasonable citi-
zens would interpret statutes?153  The question touches on the intersec-
tion of nondelegation, vagueness, and textualism, with no ready answer.
147 Nondelegation Canons, supra note 97, at 315.
148 Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982).
149 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
150 Vill. of Hoffman Ests., 455 U.S. at 498.
151 Id. at 504.
152 See Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE
L.J. 931, 934-35 (2021) (discussing how Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito,
Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh have expressed either skepticism of or a desire to overturn Chevron).
153 Textualism As Fair Notice, supra note 105, at 542.
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Whatever the answer, it seems that courts are more willing to reconsider
the constitutionality of an ambiguous, standardless statute on the void-
for-vagueness doctrine than on the nondelegation doctrine.
B. AN UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE CLEAN WATER ACT
A standardless “waters of the United States” definition violates the
void-for-vagueness doctrine.  Given the historical and commonly under-
stood meaning of “navigable waters” in 1972, if Congress had left the
phrase undefined, it would have passed muster under the void-for vague-
ness doctrine.  Forgoing that path, Congress expanded the scope of the
Act’s jurisdiction to an uncertain reach.
Complicating this uncertainty is that the Act criminalizes violations
with fines and imprisonment.154  As a criminal statute, courts expect that
Congress legislates with greater precision.155  Yet, the “reach of the
Clean Water Act is notoriously unclear.”156  The Supreme Court’s Rapa-
nos opinion reflects this lack of clarity.  If neither the agencies nor Su-
preme Court justices can arrive at a consensus about what Congress
meant by “waters of the United States,” then how could we expect a
person of ordinary intelligence to know what the law requires?   Must
they determine its reach by hydrological or biological analysis?  Other
expert evidence?  Google?  Gut instinct?157
Consider, too, that a permit under the Clean Water Act takes more
than two years on average to obtain and costs several hundred thousand
dollars.158  And that effort will be subject to the ebbs and flows of chang-
ing regulations between administrations, forcing the regulated commu-
nity to track the Federal Register and latest district and circuit court
opinions.  This demand implies that a person of ordinary intelligence will
have fair notice so long as they perform the exhausting task of tracking,
for instance, in which counties in New Mexico the 2015 regulation ap-
plies as a result of an injunction issued in pending litigation.159  It also
154 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c).
155 Vill. of Hoffman Ests., 455 U.S. at 498-99.
156 Sackett, 566 U.S. 120, 132 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
157 Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 597 (2015).
158 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (“The average applicant for an
individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing the process, and the average appli-
cant for a nationwide permit spends 313 days and $28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or
design changes.”).
159 Ellen M. Gilmer & Ariel Wittenberg, Court Sides with WOTUS Foes As Legal Fight Gets
Messier, GREENWIRE (May 29, 2019),  https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060425141/ (dis-
cussing how ten counties in New Mexico joined a coalition that obtain an injunction against the
Clean Water Rule, leaving it unclear whether the Clean Water Rule was stayed in those ten counties
or the entire state).
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implies that they have read the ninety-three page Navigable Waters Pro-
tection Rule that followed.160  When done performing that task, that per-
son must also keep tabs on litigation over that Rule, including whether
the Tenth Circuit has lifted a district court injunction prohibiting enforce-
ment of the Rule,161 or whether the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California denied a similar request for an injunction.162  Perhaps
one court may take sympathy and issue a nationwide injunction.163
Courts thus have demanded that a person of ordinary intelligence is
supposed to know what the law regulates.  But “[w]ho can even attempt
all that, at least without an army of perfumed lawyers and lobbyists?”164
Yet that is what the Clean Water Act demands of the public.165
Take the recent Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Lucero.166  The
Ninth Circuit began by acknowledging, as it must, that “[m]ost Ameri-
cans would be surprised to learn that dry land might be treated as ‘navi-
gable waters’ under the Clean Water Act.”167  But that surprise is
immaterial because, according to the Ninth Circuit, a person must still
engage in the “time-consuming, difficult, and expensive” task of deter-
mining whether a particular piece of land fits within the Clean Water
Act’s definition of “waters of the United States.”168  At issue in the case
was Mr. Lucero’s dumping of fill into a wetland between July and Au-
gust 2014.169  And during those summer months, the agencies had one
regulatory definition of “waters of the United States” in effect.170  So the
court rejected the criminal defendant’s void-for-vagueness argument be-
cause the agencies’ regulation defining “waters of the United States” at
160 Navigable Waters Protection Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250.
161 Judge Blocks WOTUS Rule in Colorado While Legal Challenges Increase, In-
sideEPA.com (June 22, 2020), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/judge-blocks-wotus-rule-colorado-
while-legal-challenges-increase (U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado issued a stay in
Colorado only that blocked implementation of the 2020 regulation).
162 California v. Wheeler, 467 F. Supp. 3d 864 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
163 S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959 (D.S.C. 2018).
164 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
165 See United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 328 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Even in the absence of
disputed agency warnings, the prevalence of wet property at BHA and an area network of creeks and
their tributaries leading to the Gulf, some of which connected to wetlands on the property, should
have alerted ‘men of common intelligence’ to the possibility that the wetlands were waters of the
United States under the CWA.’”); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 917
(5th Cir. 1983) (“if they wished to protect themselves from liability they could have applied for a
permit and thus obtained a precise delineation of the extent of the wetland, as well as the activities
permissible on the land.”).
166 United States v. Lucero, 989 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2021).
167 Id. at 1091.
168 Id. at 1102.
169 Id. at 1092.
170 Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,036 (Aug. 25, 1993).
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the time of the incident—codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) in 2014—was
“nevertheless clear.”171
Pause to reflect on this outcome.  Had Mr. Lucero waited ten
months, he may have faced a different regulation: the Clean Water Rule.
Had he waited a little more after that, a still different regulation would
have governed.
But set aside how the regulation had been substantially “revised
several times” since Mr. Lucero’s criminal act.172  His void-for-vague-
ness argument failed, not because the statute was clear, but because the
regulation in effect at the time of the act (but later replaced) was clear.173
Perhaps administrative regulations may sufficiently narrow poten-
tially vague statutes.174  But even when allowed, courts will extrapolate
the statute’s meaning from a regulation only “to some degree.”175  Agen-
cies faced with an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power
cannot cure Congress’s violation “by adopting in its discretion a limiting
construction of the statute.”176  Nor can an agency cure the violation by
declining to exercise some of that delegated legislative power.177  Nor
should courts allow agencies to cure an unconstitutionally vague statute
through regulation—especially in the criminal context.178  Allowing
agencies to save the unconstitutional statute in this way risks ad hoc,
subjective, arbitrary, and discriminatory enforcement.179  Deferring to
agency interpretations of an unconstitutionally vague statute is all the
more troubling when the agency interpretations lack any “consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements.”180
Having batted around for decades many competing regulations that
interpret a vague Clean Water Act, one wonders why courts would extra-
polate to any degree a statute’s meaning from a regulation to cure a void-
for-vagueness challenge.  In Lucero, the Ninth Circuit avoided the chal-
lenge of interpreting “waters of the United States” by considering exclu-
171 Lucero, 989 F.3d at 1102.
172 Id. at 1104.
173 Id. at 1101-02.
174 See Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 504 (1982)
(“The village may adopt administrative regulations that will sufficiently narrow potentially vague or
arbitrary interpretations of the ordinance.”).
175 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
176 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
177 Id. at 473.
178 See George v. Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc., 694 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 2012)
(finding that the Secretary of Labor has no delegated rulemaking or adjudicative authority when
interpreting statutes they are enforcing as its prosecutor).
179 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108–09.
180 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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sively the agencies’ regulations and not the statutory language.181  This
type of back-door Chevron analysis avoids the court’s constitutional duty
to say what the law is.182  “Whether the Government interprets a criminal
statute too broadly . . . or too narrowly . . . a court has an obligation to
correct its error.”183
For now, courts have punted on their obligation to correct the con-
stitutional violation happening with the Clean Water Act.  And the result-
ing regulatory changes between each successive administration invites
the question: What fair notice does the law provide if its jurisdictional
reach is subject to major changes with each new administration?  Be-
cause Congress impermissibly delegated to the executive branch the ba-
sic policy decision of what waters the Act regulates, the Act’s “navigable
waters” definition violates the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
V. SYNTHESIS: A SUSTAINED RESOLUTION DEMANDS A LEGISLATIVE
COMPROMISE
There is significant overlap and redundancy between the nondelega-
tion and void-for-vagueness doctrines.  Each ensures that, when enacting
a statute, Congress directs agencies in clear enough terms to provide the
regulators and the regulated with adequate notice about what conduct
that statute regulates.  And each ensures accountability by requiring that
the branch most accountable to the People—Congress—makes the tough
policy decisions.
Congress failed to make that tough policy decision in 1972 with the
Clean Water Act.  The regulatory volleyball happening since is a symp-
tom of an underlying problem with the statute.  The substantial ambigu-
ity and vagueness in the phrase “waters of the United States” provides
significant discretion to the EPA and Army Corps to fashion their own
definition about the Act’s outer limits.  This discretion violates the sepa-
ration of powers and its related nondelegation and void-for vagueness
doctrines.
While this article intends to explain why the Clean Water Act vio-
lates these two doctrines, it does not intend by implication to remove or
diminish the tools our government requires to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.184
The Act’s success despite its constitutional infirmities shows why a
healthy country needs effective water quality control.  This article thus
181 United States v. Lucero, 989 F.3d 1088, 1101-05 (9th Cir. 2021).
182 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
183 Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 191 (2014).
184 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
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aims to show that the Act must be improved.  And for now, that task of
improvement is for Congress, and only for Congress.
Of course, Congress’s attempt at a solution might not resolve the
problem.  A lack of consensus or uncertainty may remain after Congress
amends the Act.  And the next Congress may undo the amendment with
an amendment of its own, creating a game of legislative volleyball much
like the regulatory volleyball of old.  In other words, the synthesis (legis-
lative action) may become a new thesis (legislative uncertainty), and the
dialectic starts anew.185  After all, Publius forewarned of the “internal
effects of a mutable policy” out of concern for Congress’s—rather than
the Executive’s—constant repealing and revising of laws.186
But a legislative volleyball outcome is still more constitutionally
sound than the status quo because the elected members of Congress—
rather than agency officials—will have made the policy choice about
what the Clean Water Act regulates.  Moreover, that outcome may seem
unlikely as it assumes a responsive Congress that produces legislation
with the breakneck frequency of less politically accountable agencies.
The problem our Nation faces is not a reactive Congress, but one that
does not act at all.
Continued intransigence among our representatives and senators has
laid substantial uncertainty upon the regulated community.  To know
what the law requires, go ask your local lawyer or hydrologist.  Though
be forewarned: Their good advice will expire with the next court case or
next presidential election.  This same uncertainty also undermines effec-
tive stewardship of our environment.  When technology or case law ex-
poses a regulatory gap, neither agencies nor courts can fill the resulting
void easily when no statute allows them.
So, in a word, this article is a warning.  Having harmed both the
environment and regulated community through avoidable uncertainty,
Congress must act.  It must seek the input of hydrologists, biologists, and
other scientists; consider how federal jurisdiction affects states and regu-
lated entities alike; and heed the institutional knowledge of the enforcing
federal and state agencies.  Our members of Congress must compromise
and forge legislation with clear bounds about what the law requires.  And
in the end, despite its existing defects, we may have a Clean Water Act
still.  But only if we can keep it.
185 Hegelian Reflections, supra note 12, at 188 (the dialectic reconciles the thesis and antithe-
sis “in a ‘synthesis’ which becomes another ‘thesis’ and the process starts again.”).
186 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).
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